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PREVIEW; City of Helena v. Parsons: 





Oral arguments for City of Helena v. Parsons are scheduled for 
Wednesday, July 25, 2018, at 9:30 a.m., in the Courtroom of the 
Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building in 
Helena, Montana. Lance P. Jasper is expected to argue on behalf of 
the Appellant, Ronald S. Parsons, and Assistant Attorney General 
Mardell Ployhar is expected to argue on behalf of the Appellee City 




This case arises from Ronald Parsons’ (“Parsons”) actions 
that ended a police chase outside an elementary school in Helena in 
March of 2016.1 The city of Helena (“Helena”) charged Parsons 
with negligent endangerment and reckless driving because he 
maneuvered his truck and trailer to block the route of a suspect 
evading law enforcement, which caused the suspect to crash.2 The 
Arrest by a Private Person statute authorizes a person to use 
reasonable force to arrest another when there is probable cause to 
believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense.3 
Parsons attempted to use this statute as a defense, but was barred 
from doing so as both the municipal court and the district court 
concluded that the statute was inapplicable to Parsons’ criminal 
case.4 The jury was therefore not instructed on the statute in any 
way, and Parsons was convicted on both charges.5 Parsons appeals 
what he contests were substantially prejudicial rulings, which led to 
his conviction.6 The main issue here is whether, by not instructing 
the jury on the Arrest by a Private Person statute, the court 
substantially prejudiced Parsons and deprived him of a fair trial.   
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
   
On March 13, 2016, Chris Moore led Lewis and Clark 
                                                     
1 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, City of Helena v. Parsons, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/ 
connector/8/449/url/321Z246_03W910E6F002H27.pdf (Mont. May 21, 2018) 
(No. DA 17-0576). 
2 Id. 
3 MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46–6–502(1) (2017). 
4 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
5 Id. at 3. 
6 Id. at 6. 
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County Sheriff’s Deputy Greg Holmlund on an extensive high-
speed chase through residential and school areas.7 Ronald Parsons, 
the Appellant, observed the chase while driving his truck and towing 
his boat.8 As the chase approached him, Parsons maneuvered his 
truck and boat trailer to block the path of the fleeing Moore.9 Moore 
lost control of his motorcycle and crashed.10 He suffered injuries and 
was detained by police and charged with several offenses.11 For his 
part in detaining Moore, Parsons was charged with negligent 
endangerment and reckless driving.12 
Parsons pled not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing 
that the Arrest by a Private Person statute authorized him to stop the 
chase.13 The municipal court denied the motion, explaining it was 
not clear why Parsons had acted, and the statute only provides 
immunity from civil liability, not criminal.14 Later in the 
proceedings, the City filed motions to exclude any affirmative 
defenses Parsons might argue and to exclude several jury 
instructions, including one regarding the Arrest of a Private Person 
statute.15 After a hearing on the motions, the municipal court ordered 
that Parsons could not use the Arrest by a Private Person statute as 
a defense because it does not apply to the criminal charges against 
Parsons.16 The court explained it had already decided it was not 
relevant in Parsons’ initial motion to dismiss.17 The lower court also 
considered it an affirmative defense, which would have required 
written notice of the defense to the court and to Helena.18  
In his statement at trial, Parsons was allowed to explain his 
thought process and the reasons for his actions without support from 
the Arrest by a Private Person statute in any manner of jury 
instruction.19 The jury in the Helena Municipal Court convicted 
Parsons of both charges. The district court upheld the conviction and 
remanded the case back to the Municipal Court for sentencing.20 
Parsons was sentenced on September 20, 2017. He now appeals his 
                                                     
7 Id. at 4. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 5. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 3. 
13 Id. at 2. 
14 Brief of Appellee at 5, City of Helena v. Parsons, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/9/ 
450/url/321Z24D_040WFTGRV0003WV.pdf (Mont. April 6, 2018) (No. DA 
17-0576). 
15 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2. 
16 Brief of Appellee, supra note 14, at 9. 
17 Id. at 9. 
18 Id. at 7. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 3. 
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conviction of negligent endangerment and reckless driving.21 
 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
 
 The Arrest by a Private Person statute authorizes a private 
person to use reasonable force to detain an individual whom he or 
she has probable cause to believe is committing or has committed 
an offense, and the existing circumstances require the individual’s 
immediate arrest.22 The statute further requires that the private 
person making an arrest immediately notify the nearest available 
law enforcement agency.23 The parties disagree as to whether this 
statute is relevant to the present matter, and accordingly, whether 
the jury should have been informed of it.  
 In order to find Mr. Parsons guilty of negligent 
endangerment, the jury had to find that he consciously disregarded 
a risk, and that to do so was a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.24 
To find him guilty of reckless driving, the jury had to find that he 
operated a vehicle with “willful or wanton disregard . . . for the 
safety of persons or property.”25 Parsons argues the Arrest by a 
Private Person statute would controvert these findings of 
recklessness and negligence because the jury would see his actions 
through a different lens of reasonableness.26 The State contests the 
conviction on these two charges proves that Parsons was acting 
recklessly and negligently, and therefore the force used could not 
have been reasonable.27 
 
A. Appellant Ronald Parsons  
 
Parsons believes the jury should have had an opportunity to 
measure the reasonableness of his conduct in light of the Arrest by 
a Private Person statute.28 Parsons argues that if the jury had been 
informed of the statute, he would have been less likely to be 
convicted.29 He contests the Municipal Court should have either 
permitted him to raise the statute as a defense, taken judicial notice 
of the statute, or instructed the jury of the statute.30 By failing to 
inform the jury of the statute in any manner, Parsons contends he 
                                                     
21 Id. 
22 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–6–502(1). 
23 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–6–502(2). 
24 Brief of Appellee, supra note 14, at 13. 
25 Id.  
26 Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 11. 
27 Brief of Appellee, supra note 14, at 15. 
28 Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 20. 
29 Id. at 11. 
30 Id. at 6. 
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was substantially prejudiced.31 
Parsons mainly focuses on the lower court’s allegedly 
erroneous designation of the Arrest by a Private Person statute as an 
affirmative defense, which generally requires a defendant to give 
notice. Parsons believes the statute is a negative defense.32 He 
distinguishes that while an affirmative defense requires a defendant 
to admit to the act charged but “seeks to justify, excuse or mitigate 
it,” a negative defense serves to controvert an adversary’s claim.33 
Parsons does not admit to acting recklessly or negligently.34 
Additionally, there is no basis under statutory or case law to 
conclude the Arrest by a Private Person statute constitutes an 
affirmative defense.35 
Essentially, Parsons argues the statute would provide an 
alternative lens of reasonableness through which a jury could 
evaluate his conduct. Parsons concludes by arguing he was 
substantially prejudiced when the jury did not have the opportunity 
to evaluate his conduct in light of the statute.36  Had the jury been 
given that opportunity, Parsons contests, he would have been less 
likely to be convicted.37 
 
B. Appellee City of Helena 
 
The City of Helena side-steps Parsons’ affirmative defense 
argument and instead focuses on the relevance of the statute to the 
case. It argues that the lower courts were correct in that the statute 
does not provide a defense to the offenses with which Parsons was 
charged and is therefore irrelevant.38 Accordingly, Parsons’ 
substantial rights were not violated by failing to inform the jury of 
the statute in any manner.39  
The City continuously asserts that the statute does not 
provide a defense to the offenses with which Parsons was charged.40 
This is in part because Helena claims the statute only provides civil 
immunity, not criminal immunity.41  It further supports the assertion 
                                                     
31 Id.  
32 Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 7-8. 
33 Id.  
34 Appellant Reply Brief at 3, City of Helena v. Parsons, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/ 
connector/10/451/url/321Z25P_051C158ZD00001K.pdf (Mont. May 22, 2018) 
(No. DA 17-0576). 
35 Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 12; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 
46-15-323(2)). 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 Id. at 1. 
38 Brief of Appellee, supra note 14, at 8. 
39 Id. at 9. 
40 Id. at 9, 11, 12 and 14.  
41 Id. at 6. 
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that the statute does not provide Parsons a defense with three 
arguments: 1) Parsons did not have probable cause to arrest 
Moore,42 2) Parsons created a roadblock, he did not effectuate an 
arrest,43 and 3) Parsons’ conduct was unreasonable due to the nature 
of the charges.44 Helena adds that since the statute does not establish 
what is reasonable, it would have been confusing to the jury.45 The 
City concludes that since the statute is not explicitly a defense to the 
charges, Parsons was not deprived of a fair trial when the jury was 




 It is likely the Court will remand to the lower court for a new 
trial where the jury may be instructed on the Arrest by a Private 
Person statute. First, the statute does appear relevant to the charges. 
Second, the failure to instruct the jury did prejudicially affect 
Parsons’ substantial rights. The jury was tasked with assessing the 
reasonableness of Parsons’ conduct without knowing Montana law 
expressly states that it can be reasonable for private citizens to 
forcibly detain another person under certain circumstances.47 
 
A. The Arrest by a Private Person Statute is relevant. 
 
Parsons’ defense relied almost exclusively on the Arrest by 
a Private Person statute.48 The City presents a series of seemingly 
scattered arguments to demonstrate the statute is not relevant. 
However, there is no law to support Helena’s assertion that the 
Arrest by a Private Person statute only provides civil immunity. It is 
neither stated in the statute, nor is it a principle of common law. 
Separately, written notice of a defense is required to prevent surprise 
and to assist in orderly trial administration.49 There is no indication 
that such a requirement applies to the defense Parsons raises.50 
Nonetheless, Parsons provided verbal notice to Helena and the court 
at the omnibus hearing on May 11, 2016.51 Regardless of how the 
defense is categorized, Parsons notified opposing counsel early on 
of his intention to use the defense.  
Addressing the remaining arguments, it can be reasonably 
                                                     
42 Id. at 13. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 15. 
45 Id. at 14.  
46 Id. at 20. 
47 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 10. 
48 Id. at 18.  
49 City of Missoula v. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d 141, 149 (2012). 
50 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-323(2).  
51 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15. 
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concluded that after observing the chase twice, Parsons had probable 
cause to believe a crime was being committed.52 As to whether 
Parsons effectuated an arrest, the Court has adopted three elements: 
1) authority to arrest, 2) assertion of that authority with intention to 
affect an arrest, and 3) restraint of the person.53 The Arrest by a 
Private Person lends Parsons the authority he would not otherwise 
have to effectuate an arrest.54 The City’s final argument—that the 
nature of Parsons’ charges suggests he was not acting reasonably—
is circular. The jury made its determination without the knowledge 
that a private person can have authority to effectuate an arrest. The 
finder of fact must know what the law deems reasonable before 
making a factual determination as to whether a particular person 
acted unreasonably. With these circumstances in mind, the Court 
should find the statute is relevant to the matter.  
 
B. Not instructing the jury on the Arrest by a Private Person 
statute was substantially prejudicial to Mr. Parsons. 
 
 The purpose of jury instructions is to “fully and fairly 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.”55 Reversible error 
occurs only if the jury instructions prejudicially affect the 
defendant’s substantial rights.56 Ultimately, the jury must determine 
what is reasonable, but it must do so with a complete understanding 
of the relevant laws. The Court has stated that “in determining 
whether a prohibited statement contributed to a conviction, we 
consider the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the 
prejudicial effect of the testimony, and whether a cautionary jury 
instruction could cure any prejudice.”57 By relying on the statute, 
Parsons attempted to refute Helena’s contention that he grossly 
deviated from the standard of care a reasonable person would 
have.58 The statute could alter the lens through which the jury would 
evaluate his conduct. Failing to instruct the jury about the lawful 
authority of a private person to effectuate an arrest, in a case where 
a private person appears to effectuate an arrest, would deprive that 
defendant of a fair trial. It is likely a jury would see Parsons’ actions 




 The Court should vacate Parsons’ conviction and remand 
                                                     
52 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 34, at 3. 
53 State v. Thorton, 708 P.2d 273, 277 (1985).  
54 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-502(1).   
55 State v. Dunfee, 114 P.3d 217, 221 (2005). 
56 State v. Gray, 102 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2004).  
57 State v. Scarborough, 14 P.3d 1202, 1220 (2000). 
58 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 9. 
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this case for a new trial, finding that the Arrest by a Private Person 
statute is relevant and the jury should have received an instruction 
on it. It is up to the jury to determine if Mr. Parsons’ conduct was 
reasonable within the context of the situation and in light of the 
statute. After instructing the jury of all the relevant laws, the court 
can be confident Parsons will have been afforded a fair trial 
regardless of the jury’s ultimate determination.  
 
